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FOREWORD 
Two realities are clear: 
The difficulties associated with supplying and using energy are not 
temporary; they will continue, and we must learn to  deal with them. 
The energy problem is inherently global; no nation is untouched, 
nor can any act in isolation. 
Yet while the energy problem goes beyond the 20th century and tran- 
scends national borders, analyses tend to follow suit only selectively. Short- 
term pressures seldom permit the luxury of concentrating as much on the year 
2020 as on 1985, or of being truly global in an analysis. Still, opportunities 
do arise. 
This report summarizes the results of a seven-year study conducted at 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, 
Austria. The work, which involved over 140 scientists from 20 countries, aimed 
to provide new and critical insights into the international long-term dimensions 
of the energy problem. Given t h s  objective, the 50-year period from 1980 to 
2030 was analyzed in detail, though parts of the study looked even further 
into the future. Geographically, all countries of the world were included - 
developed and developing, market and centrally planned economies. 
The results are described in Energy in a Finite World: Paths to aSustain- 
able Future published in 198 1 by the Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, USA; more detail is provided in a second volume also from 
Ballinger: Energy in a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis. 
The picture that emerges is one of a world facing, during the 1980-2030 
period, what is anticipated to be the steepest ever increase in its population. 
At the same time, the developing regions of the world, in which most of this 
population growth will occur, will be trying to close the economic gap separat- 
ing them from the developed regions. Despite the resultant strains on the world's 
physical resources, on its institutions, and on human ingenuity, the conclusion 
is that the physical resources and the human potential exist to provide the 
energy for a 2030 world that is more prosperous than the world of today while 
supporting a population double that of 1975. Moreover, if resources are devel- 
oped judiciously and strategically, the world of 2030 could be at the threshold 
of a critical and ultimately necessary transition from a global energy system 
based on depletable fossil fuels to one based on nondepletable, sustainable 
resources. 
But creating this opportunity will entail significant difficulties. From a 
global perspective, constraints become apparent that are difficult to discern 
from a national or even regional viewpoint. These need not be crippling, but 
they must be understood. To contribute to this understanding is the purpose 
of this report. 
HOW THIS REPORT IS ORGANIZED 
It is not necessary to read the five sections of this report in sequence, 
though each draws to some extent on those preceding it. It is, however, crucial 
to understand how they are related to one another. 
SECTION 1 THE IIASA APPROACH 
There are as many analytic approaches to the energy problem as therc 
are opinions about it. Each has a limited focus and concomitant strengths an( 
weaknesses. Thus, to interpret analytic results properly requires an understand- 
ing of the process, assumptions, and methods that produced them. Section 1 
provides this understanding for the IIASA study. 
SECTION 2 THE LESSON OF HISTORY: CONSTRAINED CREATIVITY 
To begin a detailed study of the 50 years from 1980 to 2030 requires 
first, an appreciation of the history that shaped the world's energy system prio 
to 1980 and, second, an equivalent appreciation of what the future beyoncr 
2030 might possibly hold. Section 2 analyzes the past - at times going back 
more than 100 years -and examines how different energy sources and technol- 
ogies have gradually replaced their obsolete competitors throughout history. 
The analysis is quantitative; it includes energy markets at all levels, from the 
global primary energy market to national markets within various economic 
sectors. The historical regularities it reveals are impressive and pervasive. 
SECTION 3 ENERGY SUPPLY: EXPLORING THE LIMITS 
This section looks into the future, going at  times well beyond 2030. I 
explores the technological potential of each of the possible primary energy 
sources, including the fossil fuels, nuclear power, solar power, and other renew- 
able~.  The purpose is twofold: to gain some insights into what a global energy 
system based on sustainable resources might eventually look like, and to  deter- 
mine the technical characteristics of each supply possibility that will, during 
the 1980-2030 period, determine its attractiveness in competition with the 
others. 
SECTION 4 1980-2030 : DEMAND, CONSERVATION, 
AND TWO SCENARIOS 
IThe global energy supply over the next 50 years will not be exclusively fossil, exclusively nuclear, exclusively solar, or exclusively anything else. The 
supply mix that evolves will depend on the changing nature ofenergy demand, 
which will in turn depend on patterns of population growth, economic growth, 
technological improvement, and structural shifts within national economies. 
Based on the results of a set of computer models and on the analyses reported 
in Sections 2 and 3, this section describes two scenarios, each of which balances 
energy supply with demand for the 1980-2030 period. 
SECTION 5 PATHS TO A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 
No numerical results can define a unique set of conclusions directly use- 
ful in establishing energy policies. Nonetheless they can be suggestive, and such 
suggestions are the focus of this section. Here we summarize the lessons emerg- 
ing from the two scenarios and arrange the relevant analytic bits and pieces 
from the preceding sections to provide a glimpse of what some of the features 
of a sustainable global energy system might be. While it would be presumptuous 
to describe this section as presenting the solution to the energy problem, it 
nonetheless describes what we have seen while taking a long, hard look at  the 
future from our restricted historical perspective. What it presentsis not all that 
may await over our temporal horizon, but it is a part of it. 
The IIASA Approach 
It is  a truism that everything affects everything else. More 
specific to the subject a t  hand are the observations that the evolu- 
tion of energy demand depends on the supply options available, 
while the availability of different supply options i s  itself influenced 
by the level of energy demand. Moreover, both depend on environ- 
mental constraints, resource constraints, and the like. Where one 
chooses to start to impose order in all this need not be critical - 
what is more important i s  that, once a starting point has been 
chosen, the analysis proceed systematically and consistently. Thus, 
it is  the purpose of this section to explain where we started and 
how we proceeded. 
Geographically, we extended the analysis t o  include the entire 
globe. However, to  have analyzed energy supply and demand for 
every country of the globe would have been impossible, while to  
have ignored international differences in resources and consumption 
patterns would have been t o  neglect the basic causes of international 
competition and dependence. As a compromise between these con- 
flicting considerations of pragmatism and theory, the countries of 
the world were grouped into seven regions, chosen on the basis of 
national energy resources and economic structure, not necessarily 
on the basis of geographic proximity. The groupings are shown in 
Figure 1 and can be characterized briefly as follows. 
Region I North America (NA) has developed, market economies 
and is rich in resources 
Region I1 The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (SU/EE) have 
developed, centrally planned economies and are rich 
in resources 
Region I11 Western Europe, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, 
and South Africa (WEIJANZ) have developed, market 
economies, but are poorer in resources than the other 
developed regions 
Region IV Latin America (LA) is a developing region with market 
economies and many resources 
Region V South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Sahara Africa ex- 
cluding South Africa (Af/SEA) are developing regions 
with mostly market economies, but with relatively few 
resources (except for some notable exceptions, e.g., 
Nigeria and Indonesia) 
Region VI The Middle East and North Africa (ME/NAf') are a 
special case with their economies in transition and with 
rich oil and gas resources 
Region VII China and other Asian countries with centrally planned 
economies (CICPA) are developing regions with only 
modest resources 
Within this geographic framework, the period that was studied 
in detail was the next half century, from 1980 t o  2030. That such 
an extended scope and period could be considered was because of 
the unusual opportunity offered by the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis, which is insulated from many of the 
short-term pressures that often deprive corporate strategists or  
national administrators of the luxury of comprehensive, detailed, 
long-term analysis. But more importantly, we chose to  concentrate 
on the next 50 years because of what we expected t o  find there: a 
transition from a global energy system based on depletable fossil 
fuels t o  a sustainable system based on nondepletable fuels. Such a 
transition must occur sometime, and for the following four reasons 
we expected the coming 50 years t o  provide an opportunity, though 
of course with no assurance that it would be exploited: 
1. Technological inertia. The lifetimes of capital investments 
in key technologies in the current energy system, such as oil refin- 
eries and electricity generating plants, are on the order of 25-30 
years. Thus, a period of 50 years corresponds t o  two generations 
Region I Region I I 
0 
Region I I I 
Figure 1. The seven regions defined. 
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and is not too short to rule out the possibility of major technologi- 
cal transitions during the study period. 
2.  Social inertia. Because 50 years also encompass two human 
generations, this period allows time for major social transitions, 
whether manifested in individual life-styles or in international rela- 
tions. 
3 .  Market inertia. To develop a technology, whether a small- 
scale solar water heater or a new coal-liquefaction process, and to 
have it penetrate the energy market successfully are two different 
things. From a global perspective, the substitution of one energy 
technology for another cannot occur overnight;it takes time - and, 
to judge from history, quite a bit of time. As the analysis in Section 
2 of this report shows, to expect a transition to a sustainable world- 
wide energy system within a period substantially shorter than 50 
years would be to ignore history flagrantly. 




Figure 2. The population of the world, past and projected. 
4. Population growth. As Figure 2 shows, the period from 
1980 to 2030 coincides with what is anticipated to  be the steepest 
ever increase in global population. The energy problem the world 
confronts during these next 50 years is thus unique, and any analy- 
sis based on a period of less than 50  years runs the risk of under- 
estimating the pressures from population increases alone that will 
be placed on  energy supplies. 
For these reasons 50 years were thought to  be sufficient to  
represent the severity of the energy problem facing the world, and 
to allow for the possibility of a transition t o  a sustainable energy 
system. However, as is discussed in Section 4,  the transition turned 
out to be elusive. Within these 50 years and within the scope of 
our analysis, we found only the possibility of a less sweeping transi- 
tion, one that would precede the transition we had expected. This 
preliminary transition can be characterized as one from clean, con- 
ventional fossil fuels, such as natural gas and oil, to dirtier, uncon- 
ventional fossil fuels, such as heavy crudes, tar sands, and oil shales. 
But so straightforward a characterization is deceptive, as will be- 
come clear in Section 4. Time proved a more demanding constraint 
- a more scarce resource - than our intuition had anticipated. 
Sections 2 , 3 ,  and 4 present three complementary perspectives 
on the world's energy problem. Each is instructive; none is defini- 
tive. All are long-term and globally comprehensive. 
Section 2, using data covering the last 100 years as its basis, 
focuses on historical regularities in the world's energy system. 
Section 3 concentrates on the opportunities of the future 
rather than the  patterns of the past. Again the perspective often 
covers I00  years, but it is the coming 100 years, not the past 100. 
Section 4 examines the period from 1980 to  2030 in detail, 
focusing on how the balance between the world's supply of energy 
and its demand for energy may evolve during this period. It uses 
two quantitative scenarios, as well as three variations arising from 
them (a nuclear moratorium case, an enhanced nuclear development 
case, and a very low demand case). It should be stressed that in writ- 
ing scenarios we were in no sense attempting to make predictions. 
Rather, scenario writing was viewed as a way of organizing one's 
thinking and the available information; as used at IIASA its basis is 
fundamentally a rigorous insistence on internal consistency and 
global comprehensiveness. 
The scenarios concentrate on the natural-science aspects of 
the energy problem, and the methods used are those of engineering 
and economics. Limiting the analytic focus and methods in this way 
necessarily means incorporating the following implicit assumptions: 
The future will be relatively free of surprises. We shall 
neither be confronted with catastrophic wars nor rescued by tech- 
nological panaceas. The world's economic and physical regularities 
that are the subject of modem economics and engineering will not 
become transformed unrecognizably. 
However, the future will be blessed with a degree of inter- 
national cooperation that can only be described as optimistic, 
though by no means impossible. Thus what the results suggest is 
not what will be done or what should be done, but what can be 
done with the world's endowments of energy resources, manpower, 
capital resources, and know-how, if we are successful in translating 
our increasing awareness and understanding of international depen- 
dencies into increasingly effective patterns of international coopera- 
tion. In particular, there will be a functioning world trade in oil, gas, 
and coal, allowing a flow of resources from the resource-rich to the 
resource-poor. 
Those social and political dimensions of the energy prob- 
lem that are not explicitly included in the analysis will not severely 
limit the development of energy supplies during the next 50 years. 
The constraints addressed were restricted to those that are 
technical (e.g., the efficiency of electricity-generating plants), phys- 
ical (e.g., the heating values of different coal deposits), or struc- 
tural (e.g., limitations on the rate at which one energy source can 
be substituted for another in the global energy market). To some 
extent these constraints included well established concerns that 
could be described as basically political or social. But there is a 
much larger class of such social and political constraints that was 
left out of the analysis, and these must be kept in mind by anyone 
drawing conclusions from the results. 
Inflation effects are negligible. The analysis of competitive 
economics was carried out in terms of constant 1975 US dollars, 
and thus the monetary aspects of the energy problem, particularly 
those associated with inflation, were not taken into account. 
To this list should be added the following two assumptions, 
which explicitly underlie the data used in the scenarios. 
A basic unifying characteristic of the demand and supply 
assumptions incorporated in the scenarios was that they reflect a 
future in which strong energy conservation programs in the indus- 
trialized countries are pursued in conjunction with aggressive explo- 
ration for additional energy resources. 
In both scenarios, economic growth rates were assumed 
to be moderate, declining over time, and consistently greater in 
the developing countries than in the developed countries. 
These are the major assumptions to be kept in mind as one 
reads Section 4. On the one hand, they limit the sorts of conclusions 
that can be drawn from the numerical results; on the other hand, by 
restricting us to  a manageable piece of the problem, they permit us 
t o  be thorough and rigorous in our analysis. 
Finally, Section 5 returns to the motivating question: How 
may the world successfully negotiate a transition to a sustainable 
energy system? No definitive answers can be given. However, on the 
basis of the historical analysis in Section 2, the exploration of long- 
term supply options in Section 3,  and the analysis of the next 50 
years in Section 4, we can lay down the basic outlines of such a 
transition. How they will ultimately be filled in is a question that 
must be left t o  the future. 

The Lesson of Historv: 
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One studies the past to improve his control of the future, 
for the better his understanding of the physical and social forces 
over whieh he has tirtle aantroi;the more productively he can uti- 
lize the forces over which he has more control. 
An attempt to gain insights into ways in which the global 
energy system may be developed in the future must therefore begin 
with an examination of how it has developed in the past. The regu- 
larities revealed by such an exercise are stunning and sobering. 
They demonstrate that, while isolated, limited changes may some- 
times occur relatively quickly,thesystem taken as a whole exhibits 
tremendous inertia; however, they also indicate the aspects of the 
global energy system that are most responsive to change. 
To discern regularities hidden within worldwide energy con- 
sumption data, an analogy was drawn between 
different primary energy sources competing for shares of 
the world energy market, and 
other, more familiar instances of product competition (e.g., 
between brands of detergent competing for shares of the household 
detergent market or between steel production technologies compet- 
ing for shares of the steel production market). 
It was thus possible to  apply much from existing analyses of 
product substitution dynamics to  a better understanding of the 
workings of the global energy system. The process can be divided 
into three steps. 
1. From the existing established mathematical models of 
product competition, we adapted a model to suit the case of energy 
markets, be they for forms of primary energy, forms of secondary 
energy, fuels for electricity generation, or whatever. (For definitions 
of terms see the Appendix.) This model was simply a set of equa- 
tions relating the rate of change of the market share of any one 
competitor, its buildup rate, t o  the buildup rates of the others. The 
equations incorporated no assumptions about the actual historical 
market shares of different energy forms; but neither were the 
assumed relations among buildup rates arbitrary. They can more 
accurately be described as educated guesses - the question that 
remained was whether they were consistent with historical data. 
2. The model was tested by applying it to 300 cases, covering 
30  countries and energy subsystems and drawing on 60 data bases. 
The general result was that the assumed relations among buildup 
rates are indeed consistent with history. 
3. Beyond confirming the reasonableness of the model's 
assumptions, the model's applications provided further insights 
that were used, first, t o  project the direction in which trends cur- 
rently exhibited by the global energy system would lead. Second, 
they served to indicate where the global energy system is particu- 
larly responsive to adjustments, and where it is especially resistant 
to  change, 
Figure 3 shows the results of applying the model to the com- 
petition among different forms of primary energy for shares of the 
global energy market. The wavy lines represent historical data; the 
smooth lines represent the model's fit of the data, consistent with 
the assumed relations between the buildup rates of different primary 
energy sources. That the fit between the data and model results is 
so good for all four primary energy sources simultaneously (five if 
nuclear is counted) confirms the reasonableness of the model's 
assumptions for this example. The many other examples that were 
tested indicated that in fact the model's equations are generally 
applicable to  energy systems, though the smaller the ge0j.g-aphical 
area analyzed the larger the fluctuations of the data about the 
smooth lines produced by the model. 
A remarkable aspect of Figure 3 is that the lines for natural 
gas and oil, and the rising part of the coal line, are approximately 
Year 
iigurk 3. the history of global primary energy substitution. While f i s  the 
fractional market share of each technology, it i s  the transformation fl(1 - f )  
that i s  plotted against time, with the vertical scale being logarithmic, rather 
than linear. In this way results that would otherwise appear as S-shaped curves 
come out asstraight lines, thus making them easier to comprehend and inter- 
pret. However, for the value of f that corresponds to a particular value of 
f l (1 - f )  on the left-hand scale, see the scale a t  the right. 
parallel. Identical slopes mean identical buildup rates. In other 
cases there is much less regularity across energy forms. Figures 4- 
6, for example, which apply the model to  US data, show greater 
discrepancies among buildup rates. 
The principal conclusion drawn from the applications of the 
model is that the behavior of an energy submarket can be accurately 
predicted by using just a few pieces of information: 
the times at which different energy technologies first 
achieve a critical minimum share of the market (around 2% or 
3%), and 
1 850 1900 1950 2000 
Year 
Figure 4. The history of primary energy substitution in the United States ( f  
is the fractional market share of a technology). 
Year 
Figure 5. The history of the market'shares of primary inputs to electricity in 
the United States (f  is the fractional market share of a primary input). 
the buildup rate of each at the time it achieves this mini- 
mum market share. 
Put another way, once an energy resource or technology has 
captured more than 2% or 3% of its market, the system takes over, 
and further penetration of this technology in the market can be 
neither speeded up nor slowed down by direct means; the technol- 
ogy's behavior can only be influenced by introducing a new com- 
petitor into the market. 
Beyond such general conclusions are several more specific 
ones worth noting. 
1. The regular substitution rates evident in the figures can 
be characterized by the notion of "takeover time" - the hypothet- 
ical time it would take a given energy form to increase its market 
share from 1% to 50%. For the global primary energy market the 




Figure 6. The history of energy substitution in the household/commercial 
sector in the United States (f  is the fractional market share). 
2. In the European countries of the Organisation for Eco- 
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), takeover times in 
the primary energy market have been much shorter - on the order 
of 30 years. 
3. In the US primary energy market, takeover times have 
been long and stable at around 70-80 years. 
4. In the US electricity submarket before the introduction 
of nuclear power, the takeover times associated with gas and oil 
were more than 100 years (Figure 5). This submarket seems to  be 
characterized by decreasing takeover times. 
5. In general, energy systems are ponderous, but smaller 
energy systems are less ponderous than big ones. 
L 
INTERPRETATIONS 
The "system" that we describe as "taking over" the market fate of energy 
technologies is hardly monolithic or passive. It is just the opposite - 
varied and dynamic. It comprises political battles, regulatory decisions, 
bureaucratic administrations, corporate strategic planning, investment 
decisions, legal maneuverings, fluctuating consumer habits, and, in the 
I global case analyzed here, two world wars and a worldwide depression. 
Why such a heterogeneous collection of forces should display the macro- 
scopic regularities that it does is not even addressed, much less explained, 
by the model. One could speculate, but that is not the point. Rather the 
purpose is to caution against ignoring a class of regularities that have 
proved so persistent. 
At first blush this all may seem discouragingly pessimistic. Is our ability 
to improve the world's energy system quickly really so limited? The 
answer is indeed "Yes" - but such an answer is no justification for 
pessimism. An analogy that should be made is with the attempt to land 
;a man on the moon. There, what was essential was a sophisticated appre- 
ciation of the laws of gravitation (according to which things fall down), 
which were seemingly so contradictory to the objective (sending space- 
craft up). That appreciation ultimately provided the understanding of 
orbital mechanics required for success. The trick was knowing when to 
fire the spacecraft's rocket and when to let the system take over. 
From a slightly different perspective, it would be inaccurate to presume 
that, were we to leave it "unattended," the world's energysystem would 
continue to show the regularities that have characterized it to date. The 
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slow substitution of new energy sources for older ones - of coal foi 
wood or oil for coal -happened only because of much careful thinking 
and constructive activity throughout the system, all directed toward 
optimizing local situations. To suggest that this effort could be discon- 
tinued, that future energy investments could be made haphazardly, with- 
out dangerously damaejng the world's ability to provide itself energy, 
would be to miss the point entirely. We should not overestimate our 
capabilities, but neither should we underestimate them. 
. - 
What happens if our substitution model is used to project a 
future? We use the phrase, "a future," rather than "the future" 
because any projections the model makes depend critically on when 
new, emerging technologies are assumed to reach the critical mini- 
mum market share and on the values assumed for the corresponding 
initial buildup rates. 
As an example, consider the case with the following assump- 
tions: 
1. The critical date for nuclear power is taken as 1970 (1% 
of the global primary energy market). Its assumed initial buildup 
rate is at the upper end of the range defined by established energy 
sources, even though such values are below the actual nuclear power 
buildup rate of the previous decade. 
2. The critical date for solar power is taken as 2000 (again 1 % 
of the global market). The initial buildup rate is the same as that 
used for nuclear power. 
The results, which are shown in Figure 7, indicate market 
shares in 2030 of approximately 7% for solar power, 40% for nuclear 
power, and 45% for natural gas. Oil's market share is the same as 
that of solar power (7%), and coal, at  2%, controls even less of the 
market. Thus, under the assumptions of this example, by 2030 
nuclear power would not be the principal primary energy source at  
the global level, solar power's contribution would be still well below 
that hoped for by its proponents, natural gas, the dominant energy 
source, would have entered its period of declining importance, and 
coal, in contrast to the projections of so many analyses, including 
that described in Section 4 of this report, would be fast becoming 
globally negligible. 
Coal 
Figure 7. An example using the history of global primary energy substitution 
from 1860 to 1975 to project the market shares through 2030 ( f  is the frac- 
tional market share of a technology). 
This is only one set of results that can be generated with the 
substitution model, and as such it should be taken with a few grains 
of salt. Perhapsit is inappropriate to include new uses of coal - for 
producing synthetic liquids, for example - in the same category as 
the historic uses. The same might be said for comparable emerging 
uses of wood (under its current alias of biomass). Finally, the analy- 
sis dealt only with market shares - never with the actual magni- 
tudes. Thus, a solar contribution of 7% in a 2030 world using 
22.4 TWyr/yr (as projected in the low scenario of Section 4) would 
equal 1.6 TWyr/yr. This is the equivalent of 22 million barrels of 
oil per day, hardly a small undertaking when seen in absolute terms. 
(For definitions of units see the Appendix.) 
In this section we took a very long-term, macroscopic view of 
the global energy system to emphasize historic regularities. Thus, 
the future that is suggested is one very much colored by the trends 
of history. In contrast, the next two sections focus on the opportu- 
nities of the present rather than the patterns of the past. The next 
section explores, under the most optimistic of assumptions, the 
promises of different energy sources, while Section 4, taking a more 
down-to-earth perspective, describes two technically feasible scenar- 
ios in which the world's energy supply is balanced with the growing 
energy demands of the next 50 years. However, the qualitative and 




Exploring the Limits 
The intent of this section is  to be imaginative, to be explor- 
atory, to stretch our thinking. The method i s  to ask, for each of 
the different pmible energy sources, what i ts  ultimate technical 
potential would be if  only resource constraints and limitations on 
technological buildup rates (see Section 2) were considered. Prob- 
lems of environmental impacts, safety questions, or mismatches 
between supply and demand patterns are initially assumed essen- 
tially solvable. and the constraints of competitive economics are 
left for Section 4. 
The conckipn is  that tha world's energy Pesources are tre- 
mendous, althaugh taking advantage of this ablrndance can he 
neither quick nor cheap. Exploring the imptications of expanding 
any one, energy source to the ungrecssdented m l e  necessary to 
supply the weds of a rapidly growing p~puladm defines vividly 
the aswciwd safety and envirommntal questi~ns. The purpose 
here is neirher to determine an idel Irual. 05 use for mch energy 
source nor to define acceptable leds of environmental impacts. 
It is rather to give a clearer pieture of the options ultimately avail- 
able - both their good and bad sides. 
The presentation borrows the categories most often used in 
discussions of energy supply : 
Fossil fuels, including coal, oil, and gas 
nuelear power, including fission and fusion 
centralized, high-technology solar power 
* dewntralized, but not necessarily low-technology, solar 
power in conjunction with other renewables 
Considerations of fossil fuels usually begin with estimates of 
reserves and resources, and the IIASA study was no exception. 
Where it differed from past studies was in its concentration on un- 
conventional resources - on deep off-shore oil, on oil available only 
with tertiary recovery methods, on gas in tight formations or geo- 
pressure zones, on off-shore coal deposits, on tar sands and oil shales 
- in short, on fossil resources much more expensive in terms of 
money, environmental impacts, and possible social effects than the 
world is traditionally used to. 
Table 1 summarizes the resultant estimates of global fossil 
resources. The numbers in the first column, which represent the con- 
ventional fossil resources, add up to slightly more than 1000 TWyr, 
which corresponds well with conventional wisdom concerning 
global fossil resources. (For definitions of units see the Appendix.) 
But in the last column, where the unconventional, expensive re- 
sources are also included, it turns out that the total is almost 3000 
TWyr, three times higher. 
TABLE 1 Estimates of global fossil fuel resources measured in terawatt- 
years (TWyr). The price categories are specified in barrels of oil equivalent 
(boe) for oil and gas and in tons of coal equivalent (tce) for coal. 
Resource Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Total 
Coal 560 1019 - 1579 
Oil 264 200 373 837 
Gas 267 141 130 538 
Total 1091 1360 503 2954 
For oil and gas: Category 1, $12/boe or less 
Category 2, $12-$20/boe 
Category 3, $20-$25/boe 
For coal: Category 1, $25/tce or less 
Category 2, $25-$50/tce 
It is by now no surprise that coal proves to  be by far the most 
abundant of the fossil resources. But its dominance raises two prob- 
lems. The first concerns how coal is to be used to satisfy the most 
pressing component of the demand for fossil fuels - the liquid fuel 
component - and the second concerns the distribution of coal 
resources around the world. 
In looking at the first problem, it became apparent that the 
coal liquefaction schemes currently being developed all rely on auto- 
thermal processes; that is, of the three basic ingredients involved in 
producing liquid hydrocarbons from coal - carbon, hydrogen, and 
heat - all three come from the coal. The alternative is an allother- 
ma1 process, where the hydrogen and the heat come not from the 
coal but from some other source. Clearly the most important im- 
mediate effect of such an approach would be a decrease in the 
amount of coal needed to  produce a given amount of liquid fuel. 
Only one-fourth to one-third of the coal required by autothermal 
processes is needed for the allothermal schemes. But almost as im- 
portantly, the carbon dioxide released t o  the atmosphere is reduced 
to  one-fourth to one-third of the level associated with autothermal 
methods. 
In the near term, and at the national level, these differences 
between autothermal and allothermal coal liquefaction are not 
crucial. But, as will become clear in Section 4, the world is likely 
to  be relying on coal - particularly for the production of liquid 
fuels - t o  an increasing extent for at least the next half century. 
In this light, extending by a factor of three to  four the portion of 
the world's coal resources that is devoted to  producing liquid fuels 
becomes a more urgent priority. 
The second point t o  be made about coal concerns its geograph- 
ical distribution. As Table 2 shows, three countries will dominate 
the world coal market: China, the USA, and the USSR. The princi- 
pal implications of this are clear - if coal is t o  replace oil as the 
world's principal fossil fuel 
the technical infrastructure required t o  move vast quanti- 
ties of coal o r  coal products from the resource-rich t o  the resource- 
poor countries must be developed, and 
the associated institutional infrastructure must be devel- 
oped, for, although the current patterns of the world's balance of 
payments problems may shift, the problems will by no means vanish 
simply as a result of a global shift to  coal. 
For the case of nuclear power the summary also begins with 
resource estimates. But here there is an additional element, which 
arises because of the variety of nuclear technologies - which range 
from existing light water reactors (LWRs) through fission fast breed- 
er reactors (FBRs) to  fusion technologies - and the fact that the 
amount of energy that can be extracted from the earth's nuclear 
TABLE 2 The distribution of global coal resources in billions of tons of coal equivalent ( lo9 tce). 
Greater than 1012 tce Between 10" and 1012 tce Between 10'' and 10" tce Between lo9 and 101° tce 
(1000X 10' tce) (1 00 and 1000 X l o9  tce) (10 and 100 X lo9 tce) (1 and 10X lo9 tce) 
USSR 4860 Australia 262 l ndia 57 GDR 9.4 
US 2570 FRG 247 South Africa 57 Japan 8.5 
China 1438 UK 163 Czechoslovakia 17.5 Colombia 8.3 
Poland 126 Yugoslavia 10.9 Zimbabwe 7.1 
Canada 115 Brazil 10 Mexico 5.5 
Botswana 100 Swaziland 5 .O 
Chile 4.6 










Peru 1 .O 
resources depends critically on whether introducing these technol- 
ogies is coordinated so that they complement each other as produc- 
tively as possible. 
For fission reactors the resource in question is natural uranium. 
The estimate we arrived at for the amount ultimately available glob- 
ally at prices under $130/kg (1 978 US$) was 24.5 million tons. How 
much energy can be produced from this amount depends on how 
the uranium is used. 
If it is used solely to  fuel LWRs and if spent fuel is not recy- 
cled, the conclusion is that the resource could be exhausted by 
2030. This estimate is based on a reference case, which assumes 
that additional LWRs are introduced at the highest rate still consis- 
tent with, on the one hand, the findings outlined in Section 2 and, 
on the other, an independent assessment of the projected capabili- 
ties of the worldwide nuclear industry. This reference case led us 
to  a nuclear power production level of 17 TWyr/yr (thermal) in 
2030 and, as just mentioned, the exhaustion of the world's high- 
grade natural uranium resources by the same date. 
The immediate question is, "How may the lifetime of nuclear 
fission power be extended?" There are three possible approaches. 
The first involves mining the earth's vast deposits of low-grade 
uranium ore - deposits that were not included in the 24.5 million 
ton estimate made above. The disadvantage is that the low-grade 
ores - ranging from uranium concentrations of 500 parts per mil- 
lion (ppm) down to 30 ppm - would be much more expensive, 
both financially and environmentally, than the higher-grade ores. 
For example, Table 3 compares the land requirements, manpower 
requirements, and the amount of material that must be handled in 
order to support LWRs fueled by 70 ppm uranium ore, with those 
same requirements for LWRs fueled by high-grade ore (2000 ppm 
of uranium). From the requirements for coal-powered electricity 
TABLE 3 The requirements for operating a onegigawatt (electric) power 
plant. 
Material handling 
Land Mining involved, 
30-year total personnel 30-year total 
(km2 (man-yrlyr) ( lo6 tons) 
LWR (2000 ppm ore) 3 50 45 
Coal 10-20 500 32 1 
LWR (70 ppm ore) 33 300 360 
shown in the table one can see that the mining requirements for the 
case of low-grade ore exceed those for coal. 
The second approach stretches the lifetime of the high-grade 
uranium resources by assuming both improved efficiencies in LWRs 
and recycling of the nuclear fuel. But in extending our reference 
case along these lines, the 24.5 million tons of high-grade ores could 
not be made to last much more than 10-20 years beyond 2030, 
even on the basis of optimistic assumptions. Afterward, the only 
option is again the low-grade, expensive resources. 
The third possibility is to introduce breeder reactors - the 
family of fission reactors capable of using the more than 99% of 
natural uranium 'that cannot be used directly in LWRs. Considera- 
tions of breeder reactors usually envision a system based on LWRs 
of current design and an increasing proportion of breeder reactors 
that gradually replace the LWRs, eventually doing so altogether. 
The problem with this approach is that the world is already behind 
schedule; breeder reactors have not been and are not being developed 
and introduced at the necessary speed. But if the introduction of 
breeders is pursued in conjunction with enhanced LWR efficiencies, 
it turns out that the full potential of the breeders can ultimately be 
exploited. The approach that is necessary in order to reach the 
required improvements in LWR efficiencies assumes the gradual 
introduction of the uranium isotope known as uranium-233 as a 
fuel for LWRs. The source of this uranium-233 is presumed to be 
INTERPRETATIONS 
The 300,000 TWyr associated here with nuclear fission power is larger by 
a factor of 100 than the total resources of both conventional and uncon- 
ventional fossil fuels (Table 1). More particularly, it is large enough to 
justify contemplating a sustainable global energy system based on nuclear 
power. But in doing so, it is crucial to remember that these 300,000 TWyr 
only become available if the world's uranium resources are used, not to  
fuel burner reactors, but to build up a system of both burner and breeder 
reactors - a system through which the energy supply of the future could 
become effectively independent of any resource considerations. Such a 
system we label "sustainable," and the use of existing resources to create 
such a system we label "investive." The alternatives to  investive uses of 
resources are the current "consumptive" uses that characterize both exist- 
ing LWRs and, necessarily, the fossil fuels. 
thorium-232 converted in the breeder reactors; the result is a system 
capable of extracting a total of 300,000 TWyr of energy from the 
24.5 million tons of highgrade uranium resources (see box). 
The two other obvious bases for a sustainable energy system 
are nuclear fusion and solar power. The commercial introduction 
of nuclear fusion at a global level, is, we feel, more than 50 years 
away; rather than speculate that far into the future here, we will 
simply state the energy potential of fusion and leave it at that. 
Deuterium-tritium reactors could tap a resource equal to approxi- 
mately 300,000 TWyr, the same as that made available by fission 
reactors. Introducing deuterium-deuterium reactors would en- 
hance this estimate by a factor of 1000, leading to a total fusion 
potential of 300,000,000 TWyr. 
Solar power is a more immediate possibility than fusion power, 
and therefore deserves more elaboration. We shall distinguish be- 
tween "hard" uses of solar energy and "soft" uses; the label hard 
solar refers to applications involving large centralized technologies, 
while soft solar refers to decentralized uses on a smaller scale. 
The potential of hard solar is tremendous. The average energy 
input to the earth from the sun is 178,000 TWyr/yr of thermal 
energy; even after accounting for the filtering effect of the atmo- 
sphere, the usable sunlight shining in locations suitable for hard solar 
technologies is sufficient to provide energy equal to hundreds of 
terawatt-years each year. Considering the possibility of solar plants 
located in space outside the earth's atmosphere increases the calcu- 
lated solar potential even more. Thus, as in the case of nuclear 
power, solar energy can be imagined as the basis for a sustainable 
energy system - with the energy supply of the future independent 
of resource considerations forever. 
But in identifying this potential, and especially in concluding 
that the necessary usable land area suitable for hard solar technolo- 
gies exists, two qualifications must be mentioned. 
1. As in the case of fossil fuels, the world's solar resource is 
unevenly distributed among countries. In particular, much of the 
area most suitable for solar power plant sites lies in Northern Africa 
and the Middle East, areas already rich in oil and gas. A crucial 
dimension of exploiting the solar potential is therefore to develop 
both the technical and institutional infrastructures for transporting 
solar-generated electricity or fuels from the sun-rich regions to those 
that are sun-poor. 
2. Related to the large land requirement necessitated by the 
diffuseness of the solar resource is a comparably large requirement 
for materials; whether based on some configuration of mirrors, 
pipes, and valves supported by concrete structures or on some 
arrangement of photovoltaic cells, the equipment required to  col- 
lect incoming solar energy is necessarily extensive. Moreover, while 
land availability does not appear to be a problem, material availabil- 
ity may be. For orientation, a program designed to  build up over 
the next 100 years a hard solar capacity of 35 TWyr/yr could require 
each year an amount of concrete roughly equal to that produced 
worldwide in 1975. It is an intimidating result, but what must be 
remembered is that using material resources to build u p  a global 
solar energy system would be another example o f  the investive use 
of existing resources. As would be the case with nuclear power, the 
return on theinvestment would be a future energy supply essentially 
independent of resource constraints. 
The definition of solar power is often extended to include 
energy derived from biomass, hydropower, the wind, and ocean 
currents, waves, and temperature gradients. However these sources 
are labeled, an examination of their potential is a critical part of 
any assessment of the earth's energy resources, and here they are 
considered together with geothermal energy, tidal energy, and 
decentralized uses of direct solar insolation - i.e., soft solar power. 
Table 4 lists the technical potential estimated for each (the term 
technical potential again indicates that constraints associated with 
the environment and competitive economics are not taken into 








Ocean thermal energy conversion 
Tides, ocean currents, and waves 
Soft solar power 
Total 
account). The total shown in Table 4 is 17.2 TWyr/yr, which is more 
than twice the global primary energy use in 1975. Still, it is well 
below the ultimate potential of either nuclear power or hard solar 
power, and is hardly sufficient to  justify the possibility of a sustain- 
able energy system based solely on this collection of energy sources. 
But the numbers in Table 4 are by no means insignificant. 
Most importantly, to  consider using these resources at the maximum 
levels indicated in the table would be to  contemplate undertaking 
active ecological management on an awesome scale. Exploiting the 
6 TWyrlyr listed for biomass, for example, would correspond to  
managing 30 million km2 of forests, more than twice the land area 
devoted t o  agriculture worldwide in 1975. I t  would mean managing 
the habitats of thousands of species, and it would mean dealing 
with more familiar problems on an unprecedented scale - problems 
of soil erosion, managing water systems, and the decreasing resis- 
tance of cultured plants to  pests. In short, it would mean operating 
a worldwide herbarium. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from the exploration of 
supply limits summarized in this section is that nuclear fission, 
nuclear fusion, hard solar power, or  some combination of the three 
can provide the basis for a sustainable global energy system. The 
fossil fuels, soft solar technologies, hydroelectricity, biomass, and 
all the other energy forms considered here can play only a supple- 
mentary role, though by no means an insignificant one. 
But this conclusion is based on looking well into the future. 
And t o  identify where the world could end up in perhaps another 
100 years is very different from determining the direction in which 
it is headed now. This is the subject of the next section: What 
might we expect during the next 50 years? Only after this question 
has been answered can we address, in Section 5, what a transition 
from the world's current energy system to a sustainable energy sys- 





and Two Scenarios 
In Section 2 we examined the gross dynamics of the global 
energy system over the past 100 years. There we focused on the 
competition between different primary energy sources for shares 
of the world's energy market. The details of the human choices, 
the technological advances, and the economic shifts and forces 
that are buried within the macroscopic regularities were not ad- 
dressed explicitly. 
In Section 3 we explored the technical limits of different 
primary energy sources over the next half century and beyond. 
The focus was on resource potentials and engineering possibilities. 
Again the details of energy demand patterns were afforded less 
attention, and the competition between different sources - the 
central consideration of Section 2 -was not dealt with explicitly. 
This section explores in detail future energy demand and the 
competition among different energy sources contributing to meet- 
ing this demand. We extend the analysis only as far as 2030. 
The quantitative results are expressed in two reference sce- 
narios and three supplementary cases that are variations of the ref- 
erence scenarios. The principal tool used in building the scenarios 
and alternative cases was the set of computer models outlined 
briefly on page 37. 
The two scenarios are labeled the "high scenario" and the "low 
scenario." The former assumes relatively higher economic growth 
rates throughout the world, and the latter assumes relatively lower 
worldwide economic growth. The high scenario leads to a level of 
global primary energy consumption in 2030 equal to 35.7 TWyr/yr, 
which amounts to slightly more than four times the 1975 level of 
8.2 TWyr/yr, while the low scenario yields a global primary energy 
consumption in 2030 of 22.4 TWyr/yr, a little less than three times 
the 1975 level. (See the Appendix for energy unit conversion factors 
and for definitions of the levels of energy use.) 
The two scenarios are not meant to describe extremes in either 
direction, but rather to cover a middle ground. Neither are they in- 
tended as predictions; instead, the objective was to detail the engi- 
neering and economic consequences that follow from two different 
sets of reasonable assumptions. Nonetheless the results of the exer- 
cise suggest powerful trends within our current global energy sys- 
tem, and it is worth listing these before describing the scenarios. 
In the developed regions of the world there is a tremen- 
dous potential for energy conservation from efficiency improve- 
ments and expanding the economic sectors that are less energy 
intensive, such as the service sector. For these regions the average 
growth rate for final energy from 1975 to 2030 is only 1.7% per 
year in the high scenario and 1.1% per year in the low scenario. 
These values compare to a 1950-1975 average of 3.8% per year. 
In the developing regions expanding populations, increas- 
ing urbanization, and continuing development needs limit the pros- 
pects for energy savings. As a result, throughout the 1975-2030 
period primary energy growth rates in these regions are predomi- 
nantly higher than the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates, 
although the differences tend to decrease with time. In contrast, in 
the developed regions the primary energy growth rates are always 
below the GDP growth rates. 
The production and consumption of oil in both scenarios 
go up, not down, compared with 1975. Although oil's share of the 
primary energy market decreases from 1975 to 2030 (from 47% to 
19% in the high scenario and from 47% to 22% in the low scenario), 
the absolute amounts of oil used go up (from 3.83 TWyr/yr in 1 975 
to 6.83 TWyr/yr in 2030 in the high scenario and from 3.83 TWyr/yr 
in 1975 to 5.02 TWyrlyr in 2030 in the low scenario). 
Despite such increases, and even with vigorous conserva- 
tion measures in the industrialized regions, increasing needs for 
liquid fuels throughout the world may, over the next five decades, 
exceed the capabilities of the global energy supply system. In the 
high scenario primary liquid fuel demand increases from 3.83 
TWyr/yr in 1975 to 11 . l  TWyr/yr in 2030. In the low scenario the 
increase is from 3.83 TWyr/yr in 1975 to 7.22 TWyr/yr in 2030. 
These 2030 demand levels exceed 2030 oil production levels by 63% 
and 44% for the high and low scenarios, respectively. 
The gap between liquids demand and oil supply is closed 
by liquefying tremendous quantities of coal. For the high scenario, 
6.7 TWyr/yr of coal are liquefied in 2030; for the low scenario the 
figure is 3.4 TWyr/yr. For both cases this amounts to liquefying 
more than half the coal mined in 2030. For orientation, the high- 
scenario value of 6.7 TWyr/yr of coal is equivalent to 4.3 TWyr/yr 
of crude oil, which nearly equals the total world crude oil produc- 
tion of 1978. 
What oil is produced will come increasingly from uncon- 
ventional sources - tar sands, oil shales, heavy crudes, and enhanced 
recovery techniques. In the high scenario the shift is such that by 
2030 the majority of the oil produced is, in fact, unconventional 
oil. 





structural changes within economies. 
Population growth. The assumptions about population growth 
were presented in their aggregate form in Figure 2; Table 5 disag- 
TABLE 5 Global population projections (in millions of people) by region. 
Projection 
Region Base year 1975 
I (NA) 237 
I1 (SUIEE) 363 
I I I (WEIJANZ) 560 
IV (LA) 31 9 
V (AffSEA) 1422 
Vl (MEINAf) 133 
Vl l (CICPA) 91 2 
World 
gregates them by region. We see that 90% of the projected popu- 
lation growth between 1975 and 2030 occurs in the developing 
Regions IV (LA), V (AfISEA), VI (MEINAf), and VII (CICPA). 
The population assumptions for both scenarios are identical. 
Economic growth. Figure 8 shows the average 1975-2030 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates assumed for each of the 
seven different regions for the two scenarios. These averages, how- 
ever, mask an important characteristic of both scenarios - that in 
all regions of the world, the rate of economic growth continually 
decreases. The more detailed data are given in Table 6 along with 
historic growth rates for the periods 1950- 1960 and 1960- 1975. 
Except for the case of Region I1 (SU/EE) in comparison with Region 
VII (CICPA), the growth rates in the developing regions consistently 
exceed those in the developed regions, although never by much. 
That the gap is not larger reflects a recognition that, for the next 
several decades at least, the developing countries will still be tied 
to  the economies of the rest of the world through trade and other 
institutional relations. 
Unlike the population assumptions presented earlier, the eco- 
nomic growth rates of Table 6 do not represent initial assumptions 
that remained unchanged throughout the subsequent analysis. They 
are rather the result of several revisions designed t o  ensure their 
consistency with the evolution of energy demand and supply that 
is calculated to  follow from them. 
Technological progress and structural changes within econo- 
mies. For these two categories, which include the sorts of technical 
and social changes usually labeled conservation, it is more difficult 
to summarize all the scenario assumptions in a few graphs or tables. 
As an indication of the extent to which energy conservation assump- 
tions are reflected in the two scenarios, Figures 9 and 10 therefore 
present some of the aggregate results of the scenarios. 
Figure 11 is a schematic representation of the IIASA set of 
energy models as they were used in constructing the scenarios. 
The analysis began with assumptions belonging to each of the 
four categories just mentioned: population growth, economic 
growth, technological progress, and structural changes within econ- 
omies. An Energy Demand Model then calculated for each of the 
seven regions the resultant evolution of final energy demand from 
1980 to  2030. 
The projected final energy demands were translated into pro- 

TABLE 6 Historical and projected growth rates of GDP for the IlASA high and low scenarios (percentlyear). 
Historical Scenario projection 
1950- 1960- 1975-1 985 1985-2000 2000-201 5 201 5-2030 
Region 1960 1975 High I Low High ( Low High I Low High 1 Low 
I (NA) 3.3 
I I  (SUIEE) 10.4 
I l l  (WEIJANZ) 5 .O 
IV (LA) 5 .O 
V (AfISEA) 3.9 
Vl  (MEINAf) 7 .O 
Vl  l (CICPA) 8 .O 
World 
Historical 
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Figure 9. Final energy per unit of gross domestic product for the high scenario 
in (a) developed, and (b) developing regions. 
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Figure 10. Final energy per unit of gross domestic product for the low sce- 
nario in (a) developed, and (b) developing regions. 
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(-7 Assumptions, judgments, manual calculations 
A Direct flow of information (only major flows shown) 
--- 
-b Feedback flow of information (only major flows shown) 
Figure 11. A simplified representation of the IlASA set of energy models 
used in constructing the scenarios. 
jected secondary energy demands, which were then input to an 
Energy Supply and Conversion Model. Other inputs to  this model 
were, first, assumptions constraining energy supply and conversion 
possibilities (see Figure 1 1) and, second, the results of a procedure 
analyzing the patterns and prices of oil imports and exports among 
the seven regions. 
The Energy Supply and Conversion Model calculated the pri- 
mary fuel supplies and conversion facilities needed to  meet the pro- 
jected secondary energy demands at lowest cost and within the 
specified constraints. 
Associated with providing the resources and facilities indicated 
by the Energy Supply and Conversion Model, there are necessarily 
direct and indirect requirements for capital, materials, manpower, 
equipment, land, water, and additional energy. In particular, capaci- 
ties within crucial mining and manufacturing industries have to  be 
expanded. These related industrial capacities, as well as the direct 
and indirect requirements listed above, were calculated for each 
scenario using a model labeled simply Impact. 
This short summary is necessarily slightly misleading in that 
it presents the models linearly and suggests that the analysis simply 
began with the input for the first model, used each in turn, and 
ended up with some final results from the last model. In reality, as 
is usually the case with such sets of models, they were used in paral- 
lel and iteratively. The objective was internal consistency within 
each scenario, which in turn required several iterations of the mod- 
el set. The major consistency checks between models are suggested 
by the dotted lines in Figure 1 1. 
The resultant final energy consumption per capita in each 
region of the world is shown in Table 7 for both the high and low 
scenarios. Table 8 shows the corresponding primary energy require- 
ments. Whether expressed in terms of final energy consumption or 
primary energy requirements, the results of both scenarios indicate 
a noticeable reduction in the gap between the energy budgets of 
the developed regions .and those of the developing regions. The 
reduction is greater in the high scenario, where, because of overall 
higher economic growth rates, the developing regions are able to  
catch up more than they do in the low scenario. Still, in both sce- 
narios, the advances achieved in 2000 and 2030 by the developing 
countries lie well below their currently expressed aspirations. For 
example, even in the high scenario, the 2030 per capita final energy 
consumption in Region IV (LA) remains below the 1975 level in 
Region I1 (SU/EE). And Region V (Af/SEA) has by 2030 only just 
passed where Region IV (LA) was in 1975. 
As shown in Table 9, energy consumption growth rates de- 
crease throughout the scenarios for all regions, though once again 
there is a noticeable difference between developed and developing 
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World 1.46 1.96 2.86 1.58 1.83 
TABLE 8 Primary energy requirements by region (TWyrIyr) calculated 
from the scenarios. 
High scenario Low scenario 
Region Base year 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
I (NA) 2.65 
I 1  (SUIEE) 1.84 
I I I (WEIJANZ) 2.26 
IV (LA) 0.34 
V (AfISEA) 0.33 
V l  (MEINAf) 0.13 
Vl l  (CICPA) 0.46 
~ ~ o l u m n s  may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
Includes 0.21 TWyrIyr of bunkers -fuel used in international shipments of fuel. 
regions. Part of the difference is due to  the lower economic growth 
rates assumed for the developed regions, but part of it is simply 
because regions that use more energy today have more opportunities 
to  conserve. 
The resultant contributions of each primary energy source 
toward meeting the projected demand levels are shown in Table 10. 
For both scenarios the level of use increases for each source of pri- 
mary energy. Most importantly, this includes the fossil sources - 
coal, gas, and especially oil. For, although the share of primary 
TABLE 9 Final energy growth rates for 1950-1975 and projections to 
2030 (percentlyear) calculated from the scenarios. 
High scenario Low scenario 
Historical 
-- 1975- 2000- 1975- 2000- 
Reaion 1950-1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
I (NA) 2.7 
I1 (SUIEE) 5.2 
Ill (WEIJANZ) 4.3 
IV (LA) 6.8 
V (AfISEA) 6.7 
V l  (MEINAf) 10.4 
Vl  l (CICPA) 10.8 
World 
TABLE 10 Global primary energy by source (TWyrIyr) for the high and low 
scenarios. 
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'"other" includes biogas, geothermal, and commerical wood use. 
b~olumns may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
energy requirements that is met by oil decreases in both scenarios 
(Figure 12), the absolute amount of oil used increases. 
However, the oil used in 2030 is very different from that used 
today. Figure 13 shows how the scenarios project that the future 
primary liquids demand of the regions with noncentrally planned 
economies will be met. Except for oil from Region VI (MEINAf), 
none of the oil used after 20 10 comes from currently known re- 
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Figure 12. The global primary energy shares by source for (a) the high scs- 
nario, (b) the low scenario. 
- Gas 
liquids demand that is met by conventional oil reserves, including 
those yet to  be discovered, is small. For the world as a whole, Figure 
14 describes essentially the same story, though using slightly differ- 
ent terms. 
Even with the projected increases in oil production of all sorts, 
Figures 1 3 and 14 indicate that in the 2 1 st century the scenarios 
project an increasing gap between the demand for liquid fuels and 
the supply of oil. The gap is filled by liquefying coal at a rapidly 
increasing rate, as shown in Figure 15. 
Two questions are immediately raised by these results. Why 
do the fossil fuels continue to  dominate the world's energy system 
so persistently? And, given this fact, how much fossil fuel is left in 
2030, according to the scenarios? 
To the first question, two partial answers can be offered: 
First, there is the steadily increasing demand for liquid 
fuels, although both scenarios assume that in the future they will 
increasingly be reserved for essential needs (such as transportation 
and chemical feedstocks). In a sense, the demand for liquid fuels 
constitutes the key problem within the energy problem. 
Second, the rates at which new technologies can replace 
older, more inefficient users of fossil fuels are limited (see Section 
2). Figure 15, for example, indicates that even by 2030 coal used 
for generating electricity is far from having been replaced by its 
theoretically unlimited (Section 3) nonfossil competitors, nuclear 
and solar power. 
The answer to the second question, "How much fossil fuel is 
left in 2030?" is given in Table 11. There is, according to the sce- 
narios, quite a bit left, but it is not cheap, either financially, environ- 
mentally, or socially. And at the ever increasing consumption rates 
of the scenarios - already at 22.4 TWyr/yr to  35.7 TWyrlyr in 
2030 - it will not last forever. Again the scenarios' message is the 
same. During the next 50 years the crucial constraint is not likely 
to be the availability of resources; rather it will be time - the time 
needed t o  reduce the demand for liquid fuels and the time it takes 
nonfossil technologies t o  penetrate the primary energy market. 
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TABLE 11 The cumulative uses of fossil fuels. 
- - -  
Total 
resource 
Total consumed by 2030 as 
percentage of total available 
available 
Resource (TWyr) High scenario Low scenario 
Oil 
Categories 1 and 2 464 68% 57% 
Category 3 373 1 % 0% 
Gas 
Categories 1 and 2 
Category 3 
Coal 
Category 1 560 61% 40% 
Category 2 101 9 0% 0% 
Two important economic interpretations of the scenario results 
are displayed in Table 12 and Figure 16. The table shows how the 
projected growth in final energy consumption compares with the 
economic growth rates that were assumed at the beginning of the 
scenarios. The comparison is in terms of the final energy to gross 
domestic product elasticity (for definition, see the Appendix). The 
higher this number, the faster final energy use is growing in relation 
to the economy as a whole. If the value is greater than 1 .O, final 
energy use is growing faster than the economy; if the value is less 
than 1.0, the economy is growing faster. The numbers show that, 
as a general rule, as the scenarios move from 1975 to  2030, less and 
less energy is needed to fuel economic growth; that is, the societies 
of the scenarios are becoming ever more conservationist. The only 
exception to  this trend is Region I (NA), because of its currently 
tremendous potential for conservation. The scenarios assume that 
this potential will be exploited quickly; in fact, a large part of the 
conservation occurring before 2000 is due simply to already man- 
dated improvements in the fuel efficiencies of Region I (NA) auto- 
mobiles. 
The second important message of Table 12 is that, the more 
developed an economy is, the less energy it requires for economic 
growth. The elasticities for the developed Regions I (NA), I1 
(SUIEE), and I11 (WE/JANZ) are all below 1.0 (the economy grows 
faster than final energy use), while for the developing regions the 
elasticities are predominantly greater than 1.0 (final energy use 
grows faster than the economy). 
TABLE 12 Final energy to GDP elasticities, 1950-2030, for the IlASA high and low scenarios. 
Scenario projection 
Region 
Historical 1975-1 985 1985-2000 2000-201 5 201 5-2030 
1950-1975 High I Low High I Low High I Low High I Low 
1 (NA) 
II (SU/EE) 
I l l  (WEIJANZ) 
IV (LA) 
V (AfISEA) 
V l  (ME/NAf) 





Figure 16. Direct plus indirect energy investments as a share of gross domestic 
product for developed and developing regions: (a) high scenario, (b) low sce- 
nario. 
The capital investments required to  support the expanding 
energy supplies of the scenarios are indicated in Figure 16, which 
shows the percentages of the gross domestic product that must be 
invested in energy facilities. As might be expected, the situation is 
most difficult in the developing countries, where, in the high sce- 
nario for example, energy investments peak at 6.6% of GDP around 
2020. 
In addition to  the two benchmark scenarios, three alternative 
cases were also analyzed, though in less detail. As suggested by their 
titles, two of these - the nuclear moratorium case and the enhanced 
nuclear case - involved major changes in the assumptions concern- 
ing energy supply. The third alternative arose from a major change 
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on the demand side: What are the implications if we assume that 
the global primary energy demand in 2030 does not exceed 16 
TWyr/yr (compared with the low scenario value of 22.4 TWyrlyr)? 
The key characteristics of the three alternative cases turned out to 
be as follows. 
The nuclear moratorium case indicates that the energy 
demands of the low scenario can indeed be met without new nuclear 
capacity. Fossil fuel supplies are depleted more alarmingly than in 
the low scenario, gas assumes an especially important role, and solar 
electric power expands at its maximum rate (see Section 2). Needs 
are met, but costs are higher than in the low scenario (Figure 17). 
As the cushion of fossil fuels is diminished, time therefore becomes 
a tighter constraint. 
In the enhanced nuclear case, in which energy demand is 
assumed to be at the same levels as in the high scenario, the unset- 
tling depletion of fossil resources, so characteristic of both scenar- 
ios and the nuclear moratorium case, is abated only slightly. Despite 
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Figure 17. The total energy investment as a share of the gross domestic prod- 
uct for the low scenario and the nuclear moratorium case. 
the use of nuclear-generated hydrogen to  produce liquid fuels from 
coal efficiently, in 2030 only 14% of the liquid fuels produced are 
of nuclear origin, and the overall share of the global primary energy 
market held by nuclear power is only 29%. Although this is higher 
than its 23% market share in the high scenario, it remains below the 
2030 potential of 40% that appeared in both Sections 2 and 3. The 
required investments are slightly higher than those of the high sce- 
nario (Figure 1 8). 
The case in which primary energy demand reaches only 
16 TWyr/yr in 2030 necessarily implies zero growth during the 
next 50 years in the world's average per capita energy consumption. 
This is because 16 TWyr/yr represents a doubling in the world's pri- 
mary energy consumption over the 1975 to  2030 period, which 
Developing Regions 
- High Scenario 
1 .O -- Enhanced Nuclear case 
Year 
Figure 18. The total energy investment as a share of the gross domestic prod- 
uct for the high scenario and the enhanced nuclear case. 
corresponds precisely with the projected doubling of the world's 
population during the same period - from 4 billion in 1975 to 8 
billion in 2030. For the developing countries this case assumes, how- 
ever, that projected energy uses are essentially as in the low scenario. 
The result is that per capita energy consumption in, particularly, 
Regions I (NA) and I11 (WE/JANZ) must drop significantly. Math- 
ematically this can be accomplished by imposing a variety of as- 
sumptions: faster technological advances, a more rapid economic 
shift away from heavy industries and toward the service sector, 
reducing the projected uses of cars and planes, no air conditioning 
at all in Region I11 (WE/JANZ), and so forth. Whether these math- 
ematical manipulations could be reproduced in the real world by 
manipulating taxes, regulations, prices, subsidies, and all the rest is 
an open question. I t  is clear, however, that the carefully coordinated 
effort required would be unprecedented. 
Hidden within all the aggregate results presented so far are 
crucial differences among the regions. Of these the most important 
are as follows. 
Region I (NA).  Here the future of the scenarios is dominated 
by three considerations: a post-industrial, matureeconomy slow- 
down; substantial energy savings because of technological advances 
and some restructuring of economic activities; and a rapid buildup 
of a coal-liquefaction industry to  replace domestic and imported oil. 
None of these changes, except possibly the last, would be expected 
t o  produce profound or  sweeping changes in the life-styles of North 
Americans. 
The conservation effort envisioned includes, in particular, 
automobiles averaging 35 miles per gallon in 2030, homes 40% 
more efficient in terms of heat loss than in 1975, and solar collec- 
tors attached to  50% of all post-1 975 single-family dwellings. 
On the supply side, by 2030 Region I (NA) is neither a net 
importer nora net exporter of oil. In the low scenario it is also self- 
sufficient in coal, and in the high scenario coal exports in 2030 
equal 750 GWyr/yr. 
Region II (SUIEE). In Region I1 (SU/EE) the energy future is 
shaped by the clear intent to  expand industrial production and pro- 
ductivity while minimizing oil use wherever possible, and it is in 
fact industrial productivity gains that are the main source of energy 
savings. 
Through minimizing liquid fuel use and exploiting the vast 
gas and coal resources of Soviet Asia for district heat and power 
supplies the Soviet Union avoids becoming an oil importer. Oil 
exports from the Soviet Union to  Eastern Europe continue, and 
exports of coal and gas from the region as a whole expand. The use 
of primary energy sources shifts toward nuclear power and coal. In 
the high scenario nuclear power's share in 2030 is 33%; coal's is 38%. 
Region 111 (WEIJANZ). Although levels of GDP per capita in 
Region 111 (WEIJANZ) in 2030 exceed those of Region I (NA) in 
1975, Region I11 (WEIJANZ) does not adopt North American life- 
styles entirely. Extensive use of public transit systems continues, 
the use of air conditioning remains small, and the use of electricity 
for home appliances does not even reach 1975 United States levels. 
In 2030 in the high scenario Region 111 (WEIJANZ) is still 
importing 600 GWyr/yr of oil from Region VI (ME/NAf). In the 
low scenario the oil imports in 2030 are even higher, equalling 1 100 
GWyrlyr. The situation concerning coal imports is, however, the 
reverse: 1600 GWyr/yr for the high scenario in 2030, but none for 
the low scenario. 
Region I V (LA).  Like other developing regions, Latin America 
experiences a more rapid growth in GDP than the developed re- 
gions. The range is from a 1975-2030 average of 3.5% per year in 
the low scenario to  4.4% per year in the high scenario. 
Oil has been and continues to be the dominant energy source. 
In 2030 oil production in Latin America equals 30% in the low sce- 
nario and 45% in the high scenario of the total global oil production 
in 1975. Nevertheless, in both scenarios oil's share of the primary 
energy supply drops slightly. By 2030 the region is no longer an oil 
exporter in either scenario. 
Region V (AfISEA). Here the picture painted by the scenar- 
ios is bleakest. Endowed with neither energy resource riches nor 
capital wealth, while having large and rapidly growing populations, 
the favorable long-term energy options for Region V (Af/SEA) seem 
few. 
GDP growth rates are higher than in the developed regions, 
averaging from 3.3% per year (low scenario) to  4.3% per year (high 
scenario) during the 1975-2030 period. The current shifts toward 
the industrial, service, and energy sectors continue, as does the de- 
cline in the agricultural sector (from 36% of GDP in 1975 to 16% 
by 2030 in the high scenario). 
Currently the region is a net oil exporter because Nigeria, 
Gabon, and Indonesia are exporters and aggregate liquid fuel de- 
mands are relatively low. In both scenarios, however, the region 
becomes a net oil importer by the turn of the century, putting it 
squarely in competition with Region 111 (WE/JANZ) for Region 
VI's (MEINAf) oil. 
Region VI (MEINAf). Internationally, by 2030 Region VI 
(ME/NAf) is the only oil exporting region, and domestically, ap- 
proximately 90% of its primary energy needs are met by oil and 
gas. Its economic growth rates are the highest of the developing 
regions at 3.6% per year (low scenario) and 5.1% per year (high sce- 
nario) as 1975-2030 averages. In the high scenario this leads to 
GDP per capita levels in 2030 that exceed those of Region I (NA) 
in 1975. 
Region VII (CICPA). GDP growth rates in Region VII (C/ 
CPA) are high, but so are population growth rates. By 2030, GDP 
per capita levels reach approximately those of Region IV (LA) in 
1975. The region remains neither an importer nor an exporter of 
energy. Its domestic oil supplies are effectively exhausted around 
2030 in both scenarios, thus requiring increasing coal production 
and coal liquefaction in the 21 st century. In the high scenario coal 
production in 2030 reaches 3.2 TWyrlyr, as compared with 0.45 
TWyr/yr in 1975. 
This summary of scenario results is intended as neither a pre- 
diction of the future nor a prescription for solving the world's energy 
problem. Rather it reports an exercise designed to provide insights 
and a better understanding of the long-term global nature of that 
problem. The objective was simply to detail the engineering and 
economic consequences that might follow from several different 
sets of reasonable assumptions. Thus the futures described in the 
two scenarios and three alternative cases do not chart a path toward 
any special goal; more particularly, they do not chart a path toward 
a sustainable global energy system. That is the concern of Section 5. 
Paths to a 
Sustainable Future 
A central objective of the IlASA study was, as stated at the 
outset, to determine how the world might successfully negotiate 
the transition to a truly sustainable global energy system. This 
motivated the historical analysis of Section 2 (Where have we 
come from?), the long-term evaluation of supply possibilities in 
Section 3 (Where might we want to get to?), and the detailed analy- 
J sis of the more near-term future in Section 4 (In what direction 
are we currently headed?). In the end, the results did not, by 
themselves, provide a definitive answer to the original question - 
but they did prove suggestive, and it is these suggestions that are 
I 
the subject of this last section. 
' I  
There is an underlying unifying theme running throughout 
the work that, while not surprising in hindsight, was not obvious at 
the beginning. It has to do with the general pattern of the world's 
response to the increasing scarcity and expense of energy resources. 
1 As we have become more aware of the problems of energy 
/ resources throughout the 1970s, we have begun to adapt in ways 
I that make better use of the limited energy currently available. 
, Sometimes we label these adaptations conservation; sometimes 
we call them improvements in efficiency; sometimes they are 
I referred to as productivity increases. Whatever we call them, they 
rlLq 
all involve reducing the energy needed to produce some service I - 
L L  3 
(be it a well heated sitting room or intercity jet travel) by replacing 
it with something else. In some cases this replacement is  in the 
form of capital resources (e.g., investing in home insulation); in 
others it can be classified as labor (e.g., periodic tuneups of an 
automobile to increase i t s  gas mileage); and in still others it may 
be labeled simply ingenuity or know-how (e.g., anything from 
more carefully planned shopping trips to largescale reconfigura- 
tions of industrial processes). 
At a personal level, we are al l  familiar with such adaptations 
- such substitutions of capital, labor, or know-how for energy in 
producing services. At more collective levels, ranging from small 
business enterprises to international alliances, we are becoming 
more familiar with them. And what will appear in the discussion 
to follow i s  the conviction that what may now seem to us to be 
perhaps quite sophisticated, energy-conserving arrangements of 
our resources of capital, labor, know-how, and energy indicate 
only the direction in which we can travel. They in no sense even 
begin to suggest the limits of what can be done. 
I Of particular importance i s  the notion of investing these resources to increase the stock available in each category. Again, these ideas are hardly unfamiliar - investments in education, in 
research and development, in capital equipment, in exploratory 
drilling have all contributed, and continue to contribute, to the 
resources that we can put to use. What i s  less familiar i s  what these 
same concepts lead us to when applied from a global perspective 
contemplating the next half century and beyond. 
Nuclear fwion, nuclear fusion, and hard solar power were 
described in Section 3 as possible bases for a sustainable energy sys- 
tem. However, that analysis ignored entirely the question of energy 
demand - in what forms energy will in fact be needed - and from 
this perspective it is clear that nuclear power and solar power are 
not without their disadvantages. As generally conceived, they pro- 
duce energy in the form of heat that is assumed to be used directly 
sometimes or, more often, converted to  electricity. And both heat 
and, to  a lesser extent, electricity have their drawbacks: they are 
difficult to  store and to transport. It is for these reasons that, in 
situations where favorable storage and transport characteristics are 
particularly important, we have tended to  rely on chemical energy 
carriers, principally in the form of the fossil fuels. 
I t  is precisely these fossil energy carriers, however, that are 
getting scarcer. While electricity can replace them to  some degree, 
for the reasons listed above we might be better off developing an 
alternative that is itself a chemical, rather than an electrical, energy 
carrier. 
A possible candidate is hydrogen. It is attractive, first, because 
the technology for converting electricity t o  hydrogen via the elec- 
trolysis of water is well developed. Second, processes for converting 
nuclear o r  solar heat directly to  hydrogen without the intermediate 
step of electricity production appear promising. Third, hydrogen is 
much more easily stored than electricity and might be particularly 
suited to large-scale storage in depleted natural gas reservoirs. 
Fourth, the piping networks and the infrastructure associated with 
further Iargescale use of natural gas would be especially suited to  
a gradual replacement of natural gas by hydrogen. And fifth, when 
hydrogen is burned (recombined with oxygen), it produces essen- 
tially only water vapor, thus making its use environmentally attrac- 
tive. 
To introduce hydrogen on a scale comparable with that of 
electricity cannot be done overnight; but it can most certainly be 
started in a way that contributes from the beginning to  solving the 
critical, immediately pressing liquid fuels problem. Consider, first, 
hydrogen production. Among the many possible production pro- 
cesses there are some that begin by converting methane (the prin- 
cipal component of natural gas) into methanol, a liquid hydrocarbon 
fuel. Thus, even to  introduce just the first step of such processes 
would be to  introduce a capability to convert natural gas t o  liquid 
fuel - to  convert a large resource that is often wasted (flared) be- 
cause of the world's currently undersized long-distance gas transpor- 
tation system into a form in which it can be much more easily 
transported, stored, and used. 
Once hydrogen is available, moreover, it can be used to  exploit 
more efficiently the most extensive of the fossil fuels - coal. Spe- 
cifically it would allow the introduction of allothermal coal- 
liquefaction schemes, as discussed in Section 3.  Thus, hydrogen 
produced by nuclear or  solar facilities, in conjunction with the 
heat generated by the same facilities, could be used to extend by a 
factor of three to  four the portion of our coal resources that must 
be devoted to  producing liquid fuels. In view of the results of Sec- 
tion 4, such an extension could be critical. 
Still, to  produce and use synthetic liquid hydrocarbons from 
coal and other fossil resources is to  consume the store of carbon 
atoms that is available in these particularly convenient forms. If liq- 
uid hydrocarbons are therefore to  play any kind of role in a sustain- 
able energy system, the problem that must be solved is that of re- 
cycling carbon - of extracting carbon dioxide from the atmosphere 
and combining it, rather than fossil fuels, with hydrogen to  produce 
liquid hydrocarbons. The simplest way to  exploit the carbon reser- 
voir in the atmosphere is to  use the plants that are already extracting 
carbon dioxide continuously. Much technology for converting bio- 
mass into liquid fuels has been developed, and here again, external 
sources of hydrogen and heat can help conserve the carbon resource. 
A more direct way to  conserve the carbon atoms incorporated in 
synthetic hydrocarbons is to capture immediately the combustion 
gases released when the fuel is burned and then recycle them. 
These are only suggestions. They are motivated by the effort 
to  fill a crucial gap revealed by the analyses of the last three sections, 
the gap between the immediate but apparently persistent demand 
for liquid hydrocarbons and the supply of heat and electricity that 
could be produced by the only possible sustainable energy sources: 
those based on nuclear and solar technologies. The central notion 
in filling this gap is the importance of using the world's store of 
carbon atoms prudently. The basic ideas are familiar - recycling 
and using coal as a bridge to  the future. Only the scale is different: 
the continual recycling of the world's supply of carbon atoms for- 
ever - and the investment of our coal resources in building not only 
a bridge to the 2 1st century, but quite possibly a bridge extending 
all the way to the 22nd century. 
Only the outlines of how the world's energy system might 
ultimately develop can be sketched here. How they might be filled 
in must be left for subsequent analysts, and whether the course 
suggested here will be pursued at all must be left for subsequent 
generations. It is clear, however, that building a sustainable energy 
system will require the continual expansion of the world's produc- 
tive capabilities - in all dimensions. This is why it is so important 
that the eight billion or so people living in 2030 be rich, not poor, 
and much richer than today. That they be rich does not mean that 
they must discover some new treasure of physical resources that 
has been completely overlooked in the study reported here;it means 
instead that they and their predecessors will have learned how to use 
the limited resources available more efficiently, more ingeniously, 
more productively. The process is continuous, and it is cumulative. 

Appendix 
Forms of energy 
This report distinguishes between primary, secondary, final, 
and useful energy. 
Primary energy refers to  energy in the form of natural re- 
sources. Examples are oil, natural gas, freshly mined coal, water 
flowing over a dam, and natural uranium. 
Secondary energy forms are those to  which primary energy is 
usually converted in order to  be transported t o  consumers. Exam- 
ples are gasoline, electricity, charcoal, sorted and graded coal, and 
cut and split firewood. Note that a resource such as natural gas can 
be considered both as a form of primary energy and a form of sec- 
ondary energy. The form in which it appears in nature is also the 
form in which it is transported to consumers. 
Final energy refers to the forms in which energy is consumed 
once it has reached the user - the energy in a motor, a stove, a 
computer, o r  a lightbulb. Once again it is worth noting that natural 
gas can also be considered a form of final energy. 
Useful energy is the energy ultimately stored in a product or 
used for a service - a well-lit room, a moving car, or a telephone 
conversation. 
Energy units 
There are two fundamental types of energy units: those that 
describe amounts of energy, and those that describe rates at which 
energy is supplied, converted, transported, o r  used. In the first cat- 
egory are units such as barrels of oil equivalent (boe), tons of coal 
equivalent (tce), or  kilowatt-hours of electricity (kWhr(e)). In the 
second category are million barrels of oil per day (mbd), tons of 
coal equivalent per year (tcelyr), and kilowatt-hours of electricity 
per year (kWhr(e)/yr). 
The unit used most commonly in this report for amounts of 
energy is the terawatt-year (TWyr). One terawatt-year (1 TWyr) is 
equal t o  1,000,000,000,000 watt-years (which can also be written 
as 1012 Wyr). It is therefore also equal to  1,000,000,000 kilowatt- 
years ( l o 9  kWyr) or 1,000,000 megawatt-years ( l o 6  MWyr) or 
1000 gigawatt-years ( 1 O3 GWyr). 
The unit most commonly used here for rates of energy supply, 
conversion, transportation, and use is the terawatt-year per year 
(TWyr/yr). The unit terawatt (TW), which is sometimes used in 
place of terawatt-year per year (TWyr/yr), is in this report reserved 
for the description of the capacities of various energy conversion 
facilities. Thus the capacity of an electricity generating station 
might be listed as 1000 MW(e) (= 0.001 TW(e)). Since energy con- 
version facilities seldom operate at their installed capacity all year 
long, their ratings in TW or GW or MW will differ from the actual 
rate at which they convert energy, as expressed in TWyr/yr, 
GWyr/yr, o r  MWyr/yr. 
Some particularly useful conversion factors are 
1 TWyr = 30 quads (30 X 1015 British thermal units [BTU] ) 
1 TWyr = 3 0  trillion cubic feet of gas 
(30 X 1012 ft3 of gas) 
1 TWyr = 1.1 billion metric tons of coal equivalent 
(1.1 X l o 9  tce) 
1 TWyr = 5.2 billion barrels of oil equivalent 
(5.2 X lo9  boe) 
Elasticity 
The final energy to  gross domestic product elasticity e is de- 
fined as follows: if E(t) is the amount of final energy consumed at  
time r and G(t) is the gross domestic product at time t,  then, for 
t ,  < t,, the elasticity e is the exponent in this equation: 
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